



# Islamic religion teacher training in Spain: Implications for preventing islamic-inspired violent radicalism

Vicente Llorent-Bedmar, Verónica C. Cobano-Delgado Palma\*, María Navarro-Granados

Department of Theory and History of Education and Social Pedagogy, Faculty of Education, University of Seville, Spain

## HIGHLIGHTS

- This study is original insofar as it is the first to take into account the views of Islamic religion teachers.
- Most teachers believe that addressing terrorism only in the Islamic religion module would associate it with Islam.
- In the main, teachers do not feel sufficiently trained or prepared to address this issue with their pupils.

## ARTICLE INFO

### Article history:

Received 23 November 2019  
Received in revised form  
7 June 2020  
Accepted 12 June 2020  
Available online 29 June 2020

### Keywords:

Islam  
Religious education  
Terrorism  
Teacher training  
Spain

## ABSTRACT

In this study, the views of Islamic religion teachers, especially on broaching the subject of terrorism in the classroom, were analysed by administering a questionnaire and by conducting interviews. It was found that most of the respondents and interviewees had not received any training in this regard, were unfamiliar with the current regulations and did not feel fully prepared to address this issue in class. Accordingly, it is essential to warn against the dangers of implementing measures to prevent Islamic-inspired violent radicalism, without having first maintained a dialogue with the stakeholders. Otherwise, the results may be counterproductive.

© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>).

## 1. Introduction

Notwithstanding the fact that in recent years terrorism has been exclusively associated with Islam, over the ages violent radicalism has also been the bane of other religions like Christianity (Pratt, 2010). It also occurs in other organisations and groups, such as those of an ultra-right, ethno-nationalist or separatist nature (Europol, 2019). Nonetheless, the acts of violence perpetrated in the name of Islam are currently a major international concern (García & Talavero, 2019; McGilloway et al., 2015; Meehan & Meehan, 2019). This is especially the case in Spain following the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2005 and in Barcelona and Cambrils in 2017 (Poushter & Manevich, 2017).

Daesh is the group that has had the greatest repercussions on young European Muslims (IEmed, 2017). According to Frissen,

Toguslu, Van Ostaeyen and d'Haenens (2018), this group's doctrine is based on a decontextualised interpretation of the Qur'anic verses and the Sunna. For, unlike Catholicism, Islam is not hierarchically organised, there being many possible interpretations of the sacred texts (Omelicheva, 2016). In this connection, the members of Daesh claim that only they profess true Islam (Larsson, 2017).

The terminology employed to refer to the terrorism of groups like Daesh is certainly confusing. So as not to favour the stigmatisation of the Muslim community by associating jihad with terrorism, we are against the habitually employed Western neologism 'jihadist terrorism'. The Muslim teachers interviewed in this study disapprove of the term, insofar as it reduces jihad to violence. Authors like Prinsloo (2018) contend that the term 'Islamic extremism' can give the impression that it is solely of a religious nature, forgetting that groups like Daesh seek a political change by violent means. Similarly, he notes that the term 'Islamic radicalism' is unhelpful for understanding the phenomenon. Accordingly, in this study the use of the term 'Islamic-inspired violent radicalism' is advocated, thus differentiating between those with radical ideas

\* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: [llorent@us.es](mailto:llorent@us.es) (V. Llorent-Bedmar), [cobano@us.es](mailto:cobano@us.es) (V.C. Cobano-Delgado Palma), [mnavarro11@us.es](mailto:mnavarro11@us.es) (M. Navarro-Granados).

who do not defend the use of violence and those who do indeed endorse its use (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). The term 'Islamism' is also avoided here, because neither are all Islamists terrorists nor do they all resort to violence to uphold their ideas (Tibi, 2009).

As has been evinced in different empirical (Abdullah et al., 2012; Deckard & Jacobson, 2015; Zhirkov et al., 2014) and theoretical (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Moghaddam, 2005; Verkuyten, 2018) studies, Islamic-inspired violent radicalism is a multifactorial phenomenon.

Research on whether or not more religious Muslims are more likely to endorse violence has been far from conclusive. In their study of Muslims living in Western Europe, Deckard and Jacobson (2015) conclude that the more fundamentalist Muslims are more likely to endorse the use of violence to defend Islam. Other authors like Karakaya (2015) claim that a greater or lesser religiosity does not on its own predict a firmer endorsement of violence, but that this depends on the socioeconomic and political conditions of the country in question. The same can be said as regards the level of education, with some authors asserting that there is no relationship between this factor and a firmer endorsement of violence (Abdullah et al., 2012; Cherney & Povey, 2013). As to the level of education of Muslims and their possible radicalisation, Sageman (2004) identifies greater support among those with high academic qualifications, whereas for Zhirkov et al. (2014) violent radicalism is more frequent among the lesser educated.

In Europe, Roy and Kepel have offered two of the more controversial interpretations of this phenomenon. For Roy, Islamic-inspired violent radicalism should be separated from religion, since this is not its real trigger (Gurlesin, Akdag, Alasag & Avest, 2020). By his reckoning, the frustration felt by young Muslims with a Western society that has not met their expectations is highly relevant (Roy, 2015). In contrast, Kepel holds that it is essential to analyse violent Salafism and its clash with the West, given that this ideology is the root problem (Hedges, 2017).

Although most of the preventive measures implemented to date have been security-related, more attention is now being paid to education (Davies, 2009, 2016; OSCE, 2018; RAN, 2016; UNESCO, 2018). The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) contends that teachers are central to preventing Islamic-inspired violent radicalism: (1) for their ability to influence their pupils' beliefs; and (2) because they are in a good position to detect early warning signs of radicalism among potentially vulnerable pupils (OSCE, 2018).

For authors like Davies, Islamic-inspired violent radicalism should be countered at schools with a civic education based on human rights (Davies, 2009), encouraging pupils to develop critical thought (Davies, 2016). It is also important to mention those initiatives aimed at fostering the development of hybrid identities among Muslim pupils, especially those belonging to the second generation, so as to enable them to take a stand against extremist ideologies that promote a sole truth (Brooks & Ezzani, 2017).

With respect to teachers, it should be noted that they often have the following shortcomings:

- (1) They do not always have the necessary training with respect to radicalisation processes (RAN, 2019).
- (2) They sometimes do not feel sufficiently prepared to tackle controversial and complex subjects in the classroom (Quartermaine, 2016).
- (3) Many are unfamiliar with the arguments that violent extremist groups employ in their propaganda to attract primarily the young (RAN, 2016).

The most well-known European educational strategy has been the Prevent strategy in the United Kingdom. It was the first to make

teachers legally responsible for detecting early warning signs of radicalisation among their pupils (Moffat & Gerard, 2019). Since its implementation, it has come under harsh criticism because it has often produced undesired effects and because the teaching community was not previously consulted (Faure-Walker, 2019). Furthermore, it has been accused of mainly focusing on Muslim pupils (Pearce & Lewis, 2019), thus contributing to their stigmatisation and infringing on freedom of expression in the classroom (Myers & Bhopal, 2018).

In Spain, there is no national strategy like the Prevent strategy. Nevertheless, the issue of terrorist violence has been recently introduced in the Islamic religion curriculum, designed by the Islamic Commission of Spain (hereinafter CIE) and approved by the Spanish Ministry of Education.

In 2014, the rejection of terrorist violence was included as a transversal subject in the stage of primary education (BOE, 2014) in order to provide pupils with strategies with which to prevent and detect terrorism. And so as to identify the key aspects of the terrorist discourse and early warning signs of radicalisation, a thematic strand was introduced in the stage of secondary education (BOE, 2016).

Different authors consider that the teaching of Islamic religion can be an efficient tool to prevent it from being used to justify violence (Rodríguez, 2019; Trujillo & Moyano, 2008). However, it should be noted that the teaching of Islam per se can prevent violence or promote it, for which reason it is essential to be familiar with its content, the training of teachers and the interpretation of the sacred texts that pupils are taught (Zuhdi, 2018).

It has been found that formal education can contribute to prevent the radicalisation of young Muslims (Ghosh, 2018). Nevertheless, there is a need for research on the role of Islamic religion teachers in preventing this phenomenon (Rissanen & Sai, 2017) and on whether or not they have received sufficient training and preparation (Revell, 2019).

The intention of here is to address that lacuna in research on the role of Islamic religion teachers in the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism, which hitherto has not taken into account the views of the teachers themselves (Rodríguez, 2019; Trujillo & Moyano, 2008). So, the aim of this study was to inquire into the opinions of Islamic religion teachers in Spain on their training and preparation for preventing Islamic-inspired violent radicalism and the socio-educational measures that they deemed useful. To this end, the following five specific research questions were formulated:

- (1) What basic training have they received in Spain and what are their views on the prescribed requirements for exercising their profession?
- (2) What type of continuous training have they received for working with their pupils to prevent Islamic-inspired violent radicalism?
- (3) What is the main reason why the Islamic religion module is not offered when the conditions are right?
- (4) From an educational perspective, how should the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism be addressed?
- (5) What level of coordination and consensus is there among them in relation to this phenomenon?

A mixed-methods study was performed, employing a questionnaire and individual semi-structured interviews as tools for gathering their opinions.

## 2. Islamic religious education in Spain

According to the last census, there are currently 2 091 656

Muslims living in Spain, accounting for 4% of the country's population (UCIDE, 2020a; UCIDE, 2020b).

The presence of the Islamic civilisation in the Iberian Peninsula during eight centuries has left a rich cultural, linguistic and architectural legacy (Ouassini, 2019). Nevertheless, the vision of this historical period has often been incomplete and distorted (Larsson & Račius, 2010). In Spain, the opposing theses proposed by Sánchez-Albornoz and Américo Castro in relation to the influence of the Islamic civilisation of Al-Andalus on the shaping of the Spanish national identity are well-known. The exclusive vision defended by Sánchez-Albornoz, in which the Al-Andalus period is expressed through the notion of the Reconquista (García, 2017), reached its apogee during the Franco dictatorship with the National Catholic ideology (García-San Juan, 2018). For their part, Américo Castro has attempted to break with the image of Muslims as invaders, defended by Sánchez-Albornoz, by recognising the importance that this civilisation has had in the shaping of the Spanish national identity (Larochelle, 2007).

The 1978 Spanish Constitution (CE) guarantees freedom of religion and worship (BOE, 1978, Art. 16.1), before explicitly stipulating that 'there shall be no state religion' (BOE, 1978, Art. 16.3). It envisages that 'the public authorities shall take the religious beliefs of Spanish society into account and shall consequently maintain appropriate cooperation with the Catholic Church and other confessions' (BOE, 1978, Art. 16.3). Similarly, it also sets out that parents have the right to ensure that their children receive religious and moral instruction that is in conformity with their convictions (BOE, 1978, Art. 27).

Although Spain is a non-denominational state, the Catholic tradition fostered by the Franco dictatorship (1939–1975) (Díez de Velasco, 2016) and the fact that most Spaniards still consider themselves to be Catholic (CIS, 2019) have meant that the Church still enjoys certain privileges in the sphere of state education (Gunther, 2008). Nonetheless, this Catholic predominance is on the decline mainly as a result of the country's increasingly greater ethnic, cultural and religious diversity (Franken, 2017) and the accelerated secularisation of Spanish society (Ruiz, 2019).

Nowadays, the religious education offered at Spanish state and private schools is denominational (Rodríguez, 2019). The religious faiths that have signed cooperation agreements with the Spanish state include Catholicism, Islam, Judaism and Evangelism. All state schools in Spain are obliged by law to offer the Catholic religion module, which is optional for pupils, while the teaching of other religions is regulated by the cooperation agreements signed between them and the state (BOE, 2013). The module that can be chosen instead of that of religion is currently called, 'Social and Civic Values', in the stage of primary education (BOE, 2013).

The selection of religion teachers is the responsibility of the pertinent religious authorities. They establish teacher training requirements and module content always with the prior authorisation of the Ministry of Education (Garreta-Bochaca, Macia-Bordalba & Llevot-Calvet, 2019). Teachers have to hold the degree required at a national level to work as such in the different educational stages and, in addition, should obtain a certificate of suitability issued by the pertinent religious authorities (Real Decreto 696/2007). During the initial training of preschool and primary school teachers, they can take several optional Catholic religion modules necessary for obtaining the accrediting diploma (introduced by the Spanish Episcopal Conference on 27 April 2007) required to teach the subject in both educational stages.

The CIE signed such a cooperation agreement with the Spanish state in 1992. Its 'two-headed' nature (Corpas, 2010), represented by the two main member federations—the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (hereinafter FEERI), led by Mounir

Benjelloun, and the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (hereinafter UCIDE), led by Riay Tatory, the incumbent president of the CIE—makes it particularly involved.

The differences of opinion between both organisations are common knowledge. The problems started when the administration insisted on the creation of a sole official body, which would represent all Muslims and, consequently, would act as an intermediary with the state (UCIDE, 2020b).

The friction between the two major federations has hindered the development of many aspects of the cooperation agreement (López, 2011) and the implementation of measures such as the creation of a census of imams (ABC, 2017). However, the CIE has managed to make headway in issues such as the training of imams, signing an agreement with the University of Extremadura to offer a professional expert degree course (UEX, 2019). This aspect is highly relevant considering that imams are considered to be essential mediators in the fight against Islamic-inspired violent radicalism (Grasso, 2019).

As to religious education, in increasingly more plural societies it is considered essential to develop the intercultural (Rissanen et al., 2016) and interreligious competencies (European Commission, 2017) of teachers and pupils, alike. Indeed, there is a growing number of authors who defend the need to introduce a module in which all pupils have the opportunity to learn about different religions from a non-denominational perspective, so as to avoid possible prejudices and stereotypes (Díez de Velasco, 2016; Rodríguez, 2019).

In this vein, an attempt has been made in Spain to introduce optional modules in denominational religious education, such as 'Society, Culture and Religion' and 'History and Culture of Religions', introduced in 1995 and 2007, respectively. Modules of this type have since been discontinued and the decision on whether or not to include content relating to other religions has been left to religion teachers (Llevot, Garreta, Bernad, Molet & Domingo, 2018). The consensus on the inclusion of these modules is not unanimous in Spain. In a study of the attitudes of young Spaniards (Muslims, Christians, atheists, etc.) towards this issue, Dietz et al. (2011) highlighted these differences of opinion and a deeply-rooted division in Spanish society as regards the teaching of religion at state schools. For his part, Díez de Velasco (2009) places the accent on the rejection of this module by some Catholics and by those defending an anti-clerical stance, alike.

It should also be noted that the optional module 'Arabic and Moroccan Culture' is taught at state schools in which Moroccan pupils are enrolled. If there are enough pupils, it is taught during school hours and, if not, outside them. One of its main objectives is to help these pupils to preserve their identity, while respecting the host country's culture and values. The selection of teachers falls within the remit of the Moroccan government (Ministerio de Educación, 2009).

Islamic religion teachers are proposed by the CIE (BOE, 1992, Art. 10). The requirements that candidates should meet, pursuant to the provisions of Royal Decree 696/2007 (Art. 3), include the following: to possess academic qualifications (i.e., a preschool or primary school teaching degree in order to pursue a career in the preschool and primary school stages, and a Bachelor's degree and a Master's degree, in order to do so in the secondary school stage); equivalent to those required of non-university state teaching staff; and to have been proposed by one of the federations belonging to the CIE. However, the CIE may add to these requirements those that it deems fit.

Teachers are engaged for an indefinite period with the same kind of contract as state school supply teachers (BOE, 2006). Accordingly, they do not follow the same procedure for joining the

civil service as other public sector workers in Spain, namely, a selection process in which they are required to sit an official exam in open competition, called and held by the country's different state education authorities.

In order to teach the Islamic religion module at a state school, at least 10 pupils have to submit a request to the education authority in question, which, in turn, must ask the CIE to propose the name of a suitable candidate (UCIDE, 2019). However, this module still is not taught in autonomous communities with large Muslim populations (see Table 1). At present, a basic demand is only met in the pre-school and primary education stages in some autonomous communities.

For example, in light of their findings Garreta-Bochaca et al. (2018) conclude that the reason why this module is not offered in Catalonia, despite the requests of Muslim families, is that there are not enough teachers meeting the necessary requirements.

According to the president of the CIE, the education authority has used the lack of demand on the part of families as a pretext for denying Muslims this right (Tatary, 2017a, 2017b). Currently, it is the CIE that has to ask the education authority to forward it the requests that it has received from families (UCIDE, 2018). The president himself has claimed that if the education authority continues to neglect its duty to engage Islamic religion teachers, religious education will remain in the hands of mosques resorting to their own means (UCIDE, 2014).

### 3. Methodology

#### 3.1. Methodological design

The study employed a questionnaire-type, descriptive-explanatory methodology (Ortiz, 2015). Specifically, a mixed-methods sequential explanatory design was chosen (Creswell & Poth, 2012), combining quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques. This method, whose popularity has increased exponentially over the past years (Uprichard & Dawney, 2019), is particularly useful when the intention is to gain a deeper understanding of a multidimensional phenomenon that is difficult to analyse from a sole research approach (Van Velzen, 2018).

As recommended by Núñez (2017), both methods were employed consecutively. In Stage 1 of the study, a specifically

tailored questionnaire was administered to Islamic religion teachers working in Spain. This allowed for obtaining a higher number of replies and an overview of the phenomenon. Subsequently, individual semi-structured interviews were conducted with teachers who were selected following criteria that will be described in further detail below. These interviews made it possible to inquire more deeply into the replies to the questionnaire, thus enriching the study and reinforcing the confidence of the respondents (Queirós et al., 2017).

#### 3.2. Instruments

The specifically tailored questionnaire administered in Stage 1 included an initial section with identification data, followed by six dimensions based on two four-point Likert scales (1 = not at all and 4 = a lot; 1 = very inadequate; 4 = very adequate), plus other multiple-choice and open questions.

To calculate reliability, Cronbach's alpha was used as a measure of internal consistency. The resulting coefficients, with values close to the unit, indicated a good reliability for both the questionnaire as a whole (0.898) and its different dimensions (teacher training = 0.940; teaching the Islamic religion module = 0.721; school teaching = 0.857; pupils' education = 0.926; educational variables that influence the pupils' religious beliefs = 0.802; the teachers' religious beliefs = 0.844; socio-educational preventive measures = .978).

In order to guarantee content validity, the questionnaire's items were evaluated by a panel of 10 experts using a five-point Likert scale according to three criteria: clarity, relevance and adequacy. The KALPHA macro for SPSS (Version 24) was used for calculating Krippendorff's alpha reliability coefficient in order to measure the agreement among the experts. The results confirmed an optimum reliability: clarity  $\alpha = 0.853$ ; relevance  $\alpha = 0.927$ ; and adequacy  $\alpha = 0.927$  (Krippendorff, 2018).

Construct validity was calculated using two procedures. Firstly, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed using the principal component method, after previously verifying its sampling adequacy with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and Bartlett's test of sphericity. With the aim of improving the interpretation of the factors, the varimax orthogonal rotation method was employed, detecting the extraction of one sole factor in each one of the dimensions of the questionnaire.

All the scales obtained suitable measures of sampling adequacy, thus rejecting the hypothesis of sphericity with an optimum level of statistical significance (0.000) in all cases. Likewise, it was found that the items saturated in each factor at a value higher than 0.4 (Floyd & Widaman, 1995).

Secondly, the model's goodness of fit was confirmed using non-metric multidimensional scaling (PROXSCAL). Stress values (measuring data mismatches) close to 0 and adjustment measures (D.A.F. and Tucker) close to 1 were obtained, thus indicating the model's good adjustment (Biencinto et al., 2013) (see Table 2):

The following dimensions of the questionnaire, which the respondents completed online, were analysed:

- (1) Teacher training. This dimension included items relating to their basic and continuous training, in addition to their religious instruction, especially as regards broaching the subject of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism.
- (2) Teaching the Islamic religion module. This dimension included items relating to the Islamic religion module, such as: What is the main reason why the module is not offered? What are the views of Islamic religion teachers on the introduction of terrorism in the module's curriculum?

**Table 1**  
Number of Muslim students and Islamic religion teachers in Spain.

Autonomous community	No. Muslim students	No. Islamic religion teachers
<b>Andalusia</b>	<b>47 603</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>Aragon</b>	<b>9934</b>	<b>4</b>
Asturias	860	0
Balearic Islands	8648	0
<b>Canary Islands</b>	<b>9112</b>	<b>1</b>
Cantabria	592	0
<b>Castile and Leon</b>	<b>6151</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Castile-La Mancha</b>	<b>9610</b>	<b>2</b>
Catalonia	85 842	0
<b>Ceuta</b>	<b>7182</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Valencian Community</b>	<b>31 890</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Extremadura</b>	<b>3004</b>	<b>3</b>
Galicia	2161	0
<b>Madrid</b>	<b>45 919</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Melilla</b>	<b>8944</b>	<b>10</b>
Murcia	18 512	0
Navarre	4016	0
<b>Basque Country</b>	<b>9316</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>La Rioja</b>	<b>3202</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>National total</b>	<b>312 498</b>	<b>76</b>

Source: own elaboration on the basis of information provided by the UCIDE (2019, p. 11).

**Table 2**  
Construct validity of the questionnaire.

Scale	KMO	Barlett's test			Saturation coefficients	% variance	Stress and adjustment measures					
		$\chi^2$	Gf	Sig.			Normalised raw stress	Stress-I	Stress-II	S-Stress	DAF	Tucker
1	.891	544.455	45	.000	.863; .766; .737; .772; .882; .743; .732; .911; .889; .896	67.601	.00885	.09408	.20003	.02111	.99115	.99556
2	.500	17.169	1	.000	.885; .885	78.289	.00003	.00506	.01635	.00005	.99997	.99999
3	.794	92.350	6	.000	.883; .834; .914; .733	71.244	.00000	.00000	.00000	.00000	1.0000	1.0000
4	.785	101.252	15	.000	.682; .740; .678; .747; .659; .766	50.863	.00067	.02586	.07143	.00157	.99933	.99967
5	.732	161.338	10	.000	.633; .858; .884; .898; .658	63.128	.00012	.01101	.02507	.00022	.99988	.99994
6	.911	916.549	55	.000	.909; .864; .954; .891; .930; .914; .911; .934; .929; .923; .864	83.097	.00040	.01994	.02411	.00191	.99960	.99980

Source: own elaboration.

- (3) School teaching. The views of Islamic religion teachers on the introduction of a non-denominational religion module.
- (4) Socio-educational preventive measures. Items included the following, among other: How do Islamic religion teachers believe that the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism should be addressed in the classroom? Who do they think should be primarily responsible for educating the young in this regard?

In Stage 2 of the study, individual semi-structured interviews, designed on the basis of the data collected from the questionnaire, were conducted. To supplement this data, several topics of interest were considered, including the following: the academic requirements for teaching Islamic religion; continuous training; the demand for the Islamic religion module; and the introduction of terrorism in the curriculum of the Islamic religion module.

### 3.3. Participants

The study population was formed by the 76 teachers who taught the Islamic religion module in Spanish state schools during the 2018/19 academic year (UCIDE, 2020a). A participant sample of 59 teachers was obtained in Stage 1 of the study. The findings obtained here should be treated with caution insofar as they are restricted to the study context. However, the high percentage of replies reinforces the validity of the results, whose general data are shown in Table 3.

It is striking that there was a greater proportion of men than women which, far from having a sole explanation, we believe is due to several factors. The majority of the teachers participating in this study were of Moroccan provenance, which is in keeping with the

fact that the Moroccan immigrants residing in Spain are mainly men (INE, 2020). Similarly, since the appointment of Islamic religion teachers is the remit of an Islamic federation, association, mosque, etc., the presence of Muslim women among their number is still marginal (Pérez, 2018), which may have something to do with these differences. Having said that, however, the fact that there is no list of male and female teachers available—one of our study's limitations—has prevented us from determining the exact proportion of men and women.

In Stage 2, a total of 13 interviews were conducted, in terms of the following criteria (Robinson, 2014): interviewees of both sexes; differing amounts of teaching experience; and immigrants or native converts. The interviews were conducted in person or by phone and lasted between 60 and 90 min. All were recorded with the prior consent of the interviewees and then transcribed for their coding.

#### 3.3.1. Data analysis

Descriptive (percentages, averages, modes and standard deviations) and correlational statistics, plus statistical inference, were employed in Stage 1 to perform the quantitative analysis with the SPSS Statistics software package (Version 24). While non-parametric tests (the Kruskal-Wallis H and the Mann-Whitney U) were used to conduct the statistical inference analysis, once the non-normality of the sample in the study variables ( $p < .05$ ) had been verified using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) goodness-of-fit test. For inferring causal relations, it would be necessary to perform further research of an experimental nature.

The content analysis technique, with the Atlas.ti v. 7.5 software package, was used for the qualitative analysis in Stage 2. A thematic criterion (Creswell, 2012) was applied for data coding by means of

**Table 3**  
General respondent data collected in Stage 1.

Variable	Category	Frequency
Sex	Female	24
	Male	35
Age	<30 years old	4
	30–35 years old	6
	36–45 years old	28
	>46 years old	21
Stage in which he/she teaches	Primary	8
	Both (preschool and primary)	51
Years as an Islamic religion teacher	<5 years	16
	5–10 years	4
	11–15 years	18
	>15 years	21
Time living in Spain	>15 years	59
Country of birth	Spain	19
	Morocco	38
	Algeria	2
Branch of Islam	Sunni	57
	Shi'ite	2

Source: own elaboration.

the following mixed process: a deductive analysis, elaborating a total of four dimensions deriving from the questionnaire; and an inductive analysis based on the topics appearing in the transcriptions of the interviews. This resulted in the system of analytical dimensions and categories shown below in [Table 4](#).

#### 4. Results

Several study topics emerged from the analysis of each one of these dimensions. In order to inquire more deeply into the findings of this study, the quantitative and qualitative data of each dimension will now be discussed below.

##### 4.1. Teacher training and the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism

###### 4.1.1. Basic teacher training

Stage 1. The respondents had received very different basic training: one was in possession of an undergraduate degree in preschool education and 40 in primary education, while the rest (35) held an undergraduate degree unrelated to education (e.g. life sciences, nursing, engineering, business sciences, religious studies, etc.). In this last group, 14 had taken the former *Curso de Adaptación Pedagógica (CAP)*—a teaching training course enabling non-education graduates to pursue a teaching career—enabling them to teach at secondary schools, or an MA in Secondary Education ([Real Decreto 276/2007](#)), the current specific requirement for becoming a secondary school teacher.

Approximately half of the respondents did not hold the preschool or primary school teaching degree required by the Spanish Ministry of Education as of 2007 to teach the Islamic religion module in both stages.

As to whether or not the respondents believed that the specific requirements for becoming a Islamic religion teacher in Spain were adequate, 31 considered them to be 'inadequate', 22 'fairly adequate', and six 'very adequate'.

It was then determined if there were any statistically significant differences as regards their views in terms of whether or not they had taken a teacher training degree (see [Table 5](#)).

The teachers holding a teacher training degree were less inclined to believe that the requirements for teaching Islamic religion in Spain were adequate (*average range* = 720.00) than those who did not (*average range* = 1050.00).

Stage 2. These data were supplemented with those obtained in the qualitative analysis. The majority of the university graduates

occupied their teaching posts in 2005, before the requirement of a teaching degree was introduced (I. 13). Furthermore, when becoming Islamic religion teachers, there was such a dearth of candidates that they were only required to be university graduates and Muslims (I. 7, I. 2 and I. 9).

Some of the interviewees held that only those holding a teaching degree should be allowed to teach Islamic religion (I. 2 and I. 7). They also suggested that, just as Catholic religion teachers were able to choose a module during their university studies enabling them to teach the subject, so too should there be a similar system for the rest of the religions. Additionally, they wanted all religion teachers to be able to sit an official exam in open competition, as with the rest of the teaching staff at Spanish state schools (I. 8 and I. 9).

The teachers also stressed that these requirements had varied over time, this depending on who was the president of the CIE. And all of them expressed their displeasure with the constant changes in the requirements which, to their mind, were the result of the 'differences of opinion' between the two major federations (FEERI and UCIDE) making up the CIE:

'The criteria vary depending on who's the president of CIE at a given moment. When there was a change of president in the CIE [the interviewee asks the interviewer not to name the person in question] those of us who'd already obtained the MA required beforehand were obliged to take a non-accredited course. We even heard that either we did so or we'd lose our jobs' (I. 10).

These disagreements affected the teachers themselves: 'With each new president it's as if everything started from scratch, which creates a bad atmosphere among us and ultimately leads to schisms' (I. 5); 'It's a very complex issue of which we teachers have been the victims. I don't know what disagreements there may be, but they're having a negative effect on Islam and Spanish Muslims' (I. 1).

###### 4.1.2. Preparation for preventing Islamic-inspired violent radicalism

Stage 1. In view of the recent incorporation of content dealing with the prevention of terrorism in the Islamic religion curriculum in the stage of secondary education and with the rejection of terrorist violence in the stage of primary education, it was decided to ask the respondents about their academic training and preparation in this respect.

The vast majority (44) indicated that the CIE provided 'no/few' courses, resources and/or materials for addressing the topic of

**Table 4**  
System of dimensions and categories for analysing the interviews.

Dimensions	Definition	Categories	Definition
Education	Categories alluding to issues pertaining to Islamic religion teacher training	Educational requirements	Educational requirements for Islamic religion teachers in Spain
Teaching Islamic religion	Categories alluding to issues relating to the teaching of Islamic religion	Continuous training	Continuous training received for working on the prevention of terrorism in the classroom
		Availability of the module	Reasons why they believe that the module is not offered when the conditions are right
		Coordination	Coordination of teachers to reach a consensus on aspects relating to the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism
School teaching	Categories alluding to issues relating to school teaching	Terrorism	Teachers views on the incorporation of terrorism in the Islamic religion curriculum
		Teaching religions	Teachers views on the teaching of different religions from a non-denominational perspective
Socio-educational preventive measures	Categories alluding to socio-educational preventive measures	Terrorism-Muslim pupils	Teachers views on addressing terrorism only with Muslim pupils
		Education agents	Teachers views on who should be primarily responsible for educating the young about terrorism

Source: own elaboration.

**Table 5**Results of the Mann-Whitney *U* test for the variables 'basic training' and 'considering the specific academic requirements as adequate'.

	Basic training	Average range
I believe that the educational requirements are adequate	Teacher training	<b>720.00</b>
	Other studies	<b>1050.00</b>
Test statistics	Mann-Whitney <i>U</i>	192.00
	Wilcoxon <i>W</i>	720.000
	<i>Z</i>	-4.026
	Asymptotic sig. (2-sided)	<b>.000</b>

Source: own elaboration.

Islamic-inspired violent radicalism in the classroom.

More than half of the respondents stated that they felt 'fairly/fully' prepared and trained (35) to broach the subject of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism with their pupils, versus the rest (24) who admitted to feeling 'totally/rather' unprepared.

Most of the respondents (42) admitted to having 'little/no' knowledge of the arguments/messages employed by groups considered as radically violent (for instance, Daesh) to engage young Muslims.

Statistically significant differences ( $p = .001$ ;  $chi-square = 15.672$ ) were detected between this aspect and their preparation for working on Islamic-inspired violent radicalism with their pupils. It was observed that those teachers who claimed to be 'very' familiar with the arguments/messages conveyed by those groups to young Muslims felt more prepared to broach this subject in class (*average range* = 52.00) than those who admitted to having 'little' knowledge of them (*average range* = 24.31).

The respondents stated that they had received continuous training in topics considered to be of interest for enabling them to work on the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism. Specifically, they had received most training in 'interculturality' and 'interreligious dialogue' (see Table 6), with the highest average and mode (4 being the highest value) and the lowest standard deviations, thus indicating the greatest level of consensus among them. In contrast, their training in the 'messages/arguments that groups like Daesh convey to young Muslims' was the topic that was below par (2 points). As already noted, a greater knowledge in this regard would make them feel better prepared to work on the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism with their pupils.

It is striking that the respondents considered that the topics in which they had received more training ('interculturality' and 'interreligious dialogue') were less necessary for preventing their pupils from learning erroneous messages about Islam (five and eight, respectively). In contrast, they believed that 'teaching pupils to challenge violent Islamic messages transmitted on the Internet' (45) and 'counselling families on how to protect their children against these ideologies' (36) were more necessary.

Stage 2. Some of the data supplementing those collected in Stage 1 will now be discussed below. The teachers interviewed decried the lack of continuous training provided by the CIE. They blamed

this on the internal struggle between the two major federations (I. 3, I. 4, I. 8 and I. 10), which was having negative repercussions for them.

'I've been working for 14 years now and there've been two meetings. When the UCIDE convenes them, we converts aren't informed. When I phone them, they say they forgot. You've organised a course in my city and you haven't got in touch with me? Those from Ceuta and Melilla receive a lot of training because the UCIDE works a lot with the Moroccan population' (I. 3).

On the other hand, as to the arguments/messages that groups like Daesh employ to engage young Muslims, the majority of the interviewees contended that they resorted to an erroneous interpretation of the sacred texts, taking them out of context, and of the term 'jihad', exploiting the poor education of those who they were attempting to recruit. They indicated that identity issues and the feeling of exclusion/discrimination were among the main reasons why many young people felt attracted to this ideology: 'They don't become radicalised for no reason at all, but because there's a very important problem of exclusion. They give them an epic character. And there the identity issue's very important' (I. 11); 'If you feel rejected, and I'm not saying that this is the case, but if you feel that way, it's very easy to manipulate that feeling, and if someone does, the results can be catastrophic' (I. 10).

#### 4.2. School teaching and the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism

##### 4.2.1. The Islamic religion module

Stage 1. Despite the fact that in Spain families have the right to ensure that their children receive a religious education in conformity with their own convictions, Islamic religious education is a minority subject. The majority of the respondents (40) were of the opinion that this was down to the fact that many schools did not inform families about their right to request this module. Specifically, for seven there were not enough teachers meeting the minimum requirements, five thought that it was because they feared attracting a large number of Muslim pupils, thus becoming

**Table 6**

Continuous training for working on the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism.

	Mean	Mode	SD
How to address the issue of terrorism/Islamic-inspired violent radicalism in the classroom	2.27	2	.848
Arguments/messages that groups like Daesh convey to young Muslims	<b>1.92</b>	1	1.005
Counselling families on how to protect their children against these ideologies	2.08	2	.934
Teaching pupils to challenge violent Islamic messages transmitted on the Internet	2.49	2	.989
Interculturality	<b>3.31</b>	3	.565
Interreligious dialogue	3.17	3	.769

Source: own elaboration. Note: Taking into account the scale employed to score these items (1 = none, 2 = little, 3 = quite a lot, 4 = a lot), when interpreting the data shown in this table, it is important to recall that the highest value of the average and mode is 4 points (= a lot). A standard deviation (SD) closer to 1 point indicates a lower degree of consensus among the respondents.

'ghettos', four believed that the Spanish Ministry of Education hindered efforts in this regard and, lastly, three considered that it was down to a lack of political will.

Just over a quarter (14) of the respondents considered that the prevention and rejection of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism should be addressed in the Islamic religion module, nine were of the mind that this subject should be broached with all pupils in core modules, and the majority (36) believed that this should be done in both.

A considerable proportion of the respondents did not think that it was a good idea to include this topic in the curriculum of the Islamic religion module, the majority (39) considering that working on this issue only with Muslim pupils fostered the idea that they were vulnerable to terrorism (see Fig. 1). It was observed (Spearman's  $\rho$ , with an optimum significance level  $p = .001$ ) that the respondents who concurred more with this idea were less inclined to accept that this topic should be introduced and vice versa, both variables being inversely correlated ( $r_s = -.824$ ).

As to who should be primarily responsible for teaching the young to reject the violent use of Islam, 31 of the respondents held that it was a family responsibility, 16 believed that it was a task that should be undertaken by Islamic religion teachers and 12 chose the option 'everyone', including imams. Those who thought that it was a family responsibility contended that the family circle had a great influence on children and that it was their parents who should teach them Islamic values and propriety. However, they added that owing to the fact that the knowledge that some families had of Islam was wanting, they often confused customs and traditions with the religion per se. The respondents who were of the opinion that Islamic religion teachers should be tasked with this job, justified this by arguing that they were the ones who had the training to address this issue adequately and to clear up any doubts in class. Likewise, they pointed to that fact that they were close to their pupils, who saw them as role models.

It is remarkable that, despite their small number (59), 44 of the respondents admitted that there was 'little/no' coordination between them in order to reach consensus on aspects relating to the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism.

Statistically significant differences ( $p = .009$ ;  $\chi^2 = 11.618$ ) were detected (Kruskal Wallis H) in terms of the respondents' years of experience as Islamic religion teachers, thus leading to the conclusion that there was a higher level of coordination between those who had been teaching the module for more than 15 years (average range = 37.02) versus those who had been




Fig. 1. 'Working on this issue only with Muslim students fosters the idea that they are more vulnerable to terrorism'. Source: own elaboration.

doing so for less than five (average range = 19.88).

Stage 2. In the interviews, the widespread discontent as regards the information given to Muslim families on their right to request the Islamic religion module was even more palpable. The interviewees contended that different religions did not receive the same treatment in Spain, in spite of being a non-denominational state. All of them remarked that they were aware of schools that did not inform Muslim families about this right:

'The school asks families not to tick the Islamic religion box because there isn't a teacher. What they don't know is that in this way there'll never be one because the information doesn't reach either the CIE or the ministry' (I. 10).

Furthermore, the interviewees complained that Muslim pupils were often enrolled directly in the alternative module to religion, namely, 'Social and Civic Values', claiming that there was no Islamic religion teacher available (I. 9). Although, in rare instances, students with Arab names had been directly enrolled in the Islamic religion module, without bearing in mind that they might profess another religion: 'Here, that's happened to a Lebanese Christian student' (I. 12).

Some of the interviewees stressed that, through the extracurricular activity called 'Arabic and Moroccan Culture', children born in Spain were being educated to feel Moroccan, even going so far as to claim that this was leading to the phenomenon known as the 'Trojan Horse':

'That we're creating a Trojan Horse? That only promotes ghettos. The Moroccan intelligence service is to blame for this. How can there be Spanish children who say, 'The Spaniards deprived us of this'? What kind of integration policy is that?' (I. 6).

Another interviewee held that, at five schools in his city, this activity substituted the Islamic religion module (I. 2). In short, it was considered to be a flawed integration policy, the result of foreign interference.

None of the interviewees were familiar with the incorporation of terrorism prevention and rejection in primary and secondary education curricula. Moreover, there were differences of opinion in this respect, with some teachers considering that this subject should be broached in the classroom with all pupils in order to avoid associating Muslims with terrorism: 'As if terrorism were our own heritage, no? Radicalism's a human problem, the label's the least of it' (I. 7); 'When they see the word "terrorism" ... it seems inappropriate to me. We work for peace. The children often ask us, "Are we terrorists?" (I. 4). On the contrary, others held that it was indeed an issue that should be addressed with Muslim students: 'It's fine with me; in that way we clarify that Muslims aren't terrorists' (I. 5); 'Well, it's a subject that all children should study because it's associated, but it's a reality we cannot ignore' (I. 9).

Notwithstanding the fact that, in Stage 1, the majority of the teachers claimed that teaching the young to reject the violent use of Islam was primarily the responsibility of their parents, it is interesting to highlight the words of one of the interviewees in relation to the fact that some families were unaware of the facet of Jesus (Isa for Muslims), the son of Mary, as the penultimate prophet and messenger of God (Allah) (Surah 2, 87):

'When I've been talking about Jesus in class, some parents ask me, 'Why do you talk about Jesus with my son? He doesn't belong to the Muslims!' And I explain to them that he's just another prophet. I believe we help our students to adapt the religion they learn at home to society' (I. 3).



In addition to this disinformation or lack of knowledge, the interviewees referred to two issues that they considered to be a hindrance in relation to the religion that pupils were taught at home:

- (1) The concern expressed by many families that their children might learn aspects that, according to them, were prohibited in Islam ('haram'): 'Some parents tell us that their children shouldn't listen to music or dance, but that contradicts Islam because Muhammad was welcomed in Medina with songs. Children must live in their own age' (I. 5).
- (2) The identity conflicts that, unintentionally, they may cause in their children:

'Many parents tell their children that while they're Moroccan, they're Spanish. The latter think that if their parents are Moroccan, then they are as well. I have to explain to them that being Spanish does mean being Christian. It's an issue I have to work on a lot. We have a serious problem. The culture of Arab countries isn't Islam' (I. 2).

In relation to possible identity conflicts, it is worth noting the opinion offered by one of the teachers interviewed about the education that some of his students received thanks to parabolic antennas:

'I teach Spanish students who've never watched Spanish TV. They only watch satellite TV. They watch the same programmes as in Palestine and other Arab countries and that's a mistake. We're creating a generation of children who don't feel Spanish. I'm pro-Palestinian, but when they see the constant cruelty with which those children are treated, that can manipulate a child' (I. 6).

As to the scant coordination between the teachers in order to reach consensus on aspects relating to the prevention of Islamic-inspired violent radicalism, the majority of the interviewees blamed it mainly on the polarisation of a fragmented teaching body as a result of the infighting of two major federations making up the CIE.

#### 4.2.2. Teaching religions from a non-denominational perspective

Stage 1. The majority of the respondents (38) considered that it was 'rather/totally' necessary to introduce a module in which the history of religions was taught from a non-denominational point of view, versus 21 who believed that this was 'rather/completely' unnecessary.

Statistically significant differences ( $p = .000$ ; *Mann Whitney*  $U = 16.500$ ) were detected in terms of gender, with the female respondents being more in favour of introducing this module (*average range* = 46.81) than their male colleagues (*average range* = 18.47).

Stage 2. Some of the interviewees claimed that pupils as a whole should have a basic knowledge of all religions, in order to combat prejudices and stereotypes. Moreover, they considered that this would be an opportunity to address any type of violent religious radicalism with pupils. Similarly, they stressed the need for an intercultural education not only for all pupils, but also for all teachers: 'It's necessary to train the teachers. My director tells me, "Your Moroccan children are waiting for you in there." What Moroccan children? They're Spanish!' (I. 1); 'Those who were born here are still seen as foreigners. The ministry should introduce a module covering this' (I. 4); 'My pupils call me the Moroccan

religion teacher. That's another battle. There're Swedish Muslims but we shouldn't be surprised. We have to break down the Islam-Arab barrier' (I. 9). One of the interviewees illustrated the problem stemming from ignorance and the stereotypes associating Islam with terrorism. Specifically, he was referring to the Arabic phrase 'Allahu Akbar', which means 'God is great' and which is employed by terrorists to justify their attacks:

'One day, the head teacher called me because some families had complained that they had heard their children use radical expressions. I asked him, 'Like what?' 'Allahu Akbar.' That's not a radical expression! Or is crossing yourself one for you?' (I. 8).

## 5. Discussion and conclusions

So that families can exercise their right to ensure that their children receive a religious education in conformity with their own convictions, there is a need to tackle the obstacles that we have detected in this study. In light of our findings, we can state that, from a religious perspective, the current non-denominational state model is not adequately meeting the needs of a plural society. According to the majority of the respondents and interviewees, the Islamic religion module is not taught at schools where there is a sufficient number of Muslim pupils, basically because they do not inform Muslim families that they have a right to request it. Therefore, our findings differ from those obtained by [Garreta-Bochaca et al. \(2018\)](#) in Catalonia (Spain), who conclude that this shortcoming is due to the fact that they are not enough teachers meeting the requirements.

Sometimes, it is the schools themselves that are unfamiliar with this right and/or the procedure that they should follow so that Muslim pupils can study the Islamic religion module. This, together with the stereotypical way in which, according to the teachers, their colleagues view Islam and Muslims, stress how urgent it is to include religious ([European Commission, 2017](#)) and intercultural ([Rissanen et al., 2016](#)) literacy in basic teaching training. Among other issues, this would contribute to understand that Islam is just another aspect of the Spanish national identity ([García & Talavero, 2019](#); [Ouassini, 2019](#)). So, although several previous studies have demonstrated that teachers can familiarise themselves with different religions by resorting to informal learning methods ([Aown, 2011](#)), in our opinion this should be included in basic teaching training. We are aware that this measure would not on its own automatically contribute to combat Islamic-inspired violent radicalism, for there is a need for a critical debate involving all of the stakeholders, something that could be addressed in future research. According to the RAN, however, this 'generic prevention' measure, among others, is essential in order that the teachers themselves should accept and know how to manage adequately religious and cultural diversity in the classroom ([RAN, 2016](#)). It would thus be possible to avoid stereotypes associated with Islam, which could lead to feelings of frustration and injustice among Muslim pupils ([RAN, 2015](#)).

With respect to the formal academic requirements for Islamic religion teachers in Spain, the results of the questionnaire confirm that approximately half of them do not hold the teaching degree required of them to teach the module in the preschool and primary school stages.

In view of the possible relationship with their membership or sympathies for one of the two major federations making up the CIE (UCIDE and FEERI), we have arrived at two conclusions:

- (1) The CIE's greater consolidation would be essential so as to prevent it from continually introducing changes in the

religious instruction required of Islamic religion teachers, depending on the incumbent president. However, we are aware of how difficult this would be in practice, given the complexity of creating a body that manages to represent the interests and needs of Muslims from very different social and political, rather than religious, backgrounds (Elghazi, 2018). To our mind, it is of paramount importance to cease to consider Islam as a monolithic religion (Aown, 2011) and to attempt to manage adequately its intrinsic diversity, without letting internal differences outweigh the interests and needs of Muslims themselves. In this connection, the differences of opinion between the two major federations are not only hindering the development of the cooperation agreement between the CIE and the Spanish state, but are also, as our findings have revealed, affecting the teachers themselves. According to them, this is the main reason why they hardly liaise with each other.

- (2) It would be very useful to introduce an optional Islamic religion module in teaching degree programmes, as occurs with Catholic religion. Given that there is no accredited Islamic religion teaching degree at a national level that enables them to teach the module, a list of teachers holding the teaching degree required in the preschool and primary school stages would simplify matters. Owing to the discrepancies in the CIE, on the one hand, and the different interpretations that Muslims make of Islam (Omeliicheva, 2016), on the other, designing such a module may not be such a simple task. We believe that the curricula of the preschool and primary school Islamic religion modules, already agreed between the CIE and the Spanish Ministry of Education, could serve as a basis for designing this module. Likewise, it should revolve around the five basic pillars of Islam that unite the Muslim community the world over.

According to the majority of the teachers, the CIE did not provide them with courses, materials or resources for working to prevent Islamic-inspired violent radicalism in the classroom. We detected that a considerable number of the teachers did not feel sufficiently prepared to broach this subject with their pupils, which coincides with studies previously performed in England (Quartermaine, 2016). Our research has allowed us to infer the need for Islamic religion teachers to be aware of the arguments and messages that violent groups, like Daesh, convey to young Muslims on the Internet (RAN, 2016), since those who claimed to have a greater knowledge of such arguments and messages felt better prepared to address this issue in the classroom. In addition, the teachers indicated that they had received even less training in this respect, something that they considered very necessary. In sum, there is a lack of training in how to teach pupils to challenge the violent messages relating to Islam disseminated on the Internet and to counsel families on how to protect their children against these ideologies.

As stipulated in the aforementioned legal regulations, in the primary school Islamic religion module teachers should work on the rejection of terrorism as a transversal theme (BOE, 2014). While in the fourth year of obligatory secondary education (with pupils approximately aged between 15 and 16), there should be a new block of curricular content specifically addressing terrorism, with the following two objectives: (1) 'To know, analyse and assess the effects of extremism and fundamentalism on social coexistence and peace'; and (2) 'To know, analyse, discuss and assess violent radicalism' (BOE, 2016, p. 20536). Together with the majority of the teachers and concurring with the recommendations made by the RAN (2015) in this respect, in our view this issue should be addressed in both the Islamic religion module and other core

modules. Furthermore, we agree with the majority of the teachers who consider that if this subject is only broached with Muslim pupils, this will foster the idea that they are more vulnerable to terrorism.

Unlike in the Prevent strategy in the United Kingdom (Moffat & Gerard, 2019), in Spain teachers are not legally obliged to detect early warning signs of radicalisation among their pupils. Nonetheless, we believe that the measures implemented in Spain are based, in part, on similar presuppositions. If the Prevent strategy, aimed at all pupils, has obtained results contrary to those desired, stigmatising Muslim pupils (Myers & Bhopal, 2018; Qurashi, 2018), what is to be expected of the measures exclusively aimed at Muslim pupils implemented in Spain?

The teachers participating in our study believed that it was largely up to families to educate their children about this issue and that, teachers, in collaboration with families, should also actively participate in this task. Their role is certainly important, especially when bearing in mind that many families do not have a profound knowledge of Islam.

One of the potential problems that several of teachers identified is the 'Trojan Horse' phenomenon. To their mind, a considerable number of Spanish Muslims are frequently educated by their immigrant parents to feel Moroccan, rather than Spanish. In view of this complicated phenomenon, our position is eclectic. Understanding social integration as a necessarily two-way process, we hold that Muslim pupils' sense of belonging to Spain should be fostered, but without depriving them of their Moroccan roots.

The perceptions of the teachers, especially those of the women, reveal the importance of introducing a module in which pupils can learn about different religions. However, teachers would require intercultural and interreligious training, since, on the contrary, stereotypes and prejudices would still prevail. We consider that this initiative may be a suitable strategy for preventing all types of violent religious radicalism, owing to its focus on intolerance as the root cause of this serious problem (Ibarra, 2018; Rea-Ramírez & Ramírez, 2017).

The fact that the Islamic religion teachers were unaware of the introduction of terrorism in the module's curriculum in 2014 and 2016, is a clear example of the lack of dialogue between them and the body representing them, namely, the CIE, and the education authority. This lack of dialogue is all the more worrying considering that the CIE participated in the design of the curriculum and, therefore, in the inclusion of such content. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that a system should be created in which Islamic religion teachers can participate actively and democratically in the organisations representing them, thus establishing a direct communication channel between them and the education authority.

Our findings underscore the need for caution when implementing measures of this type. It would first be necessary to gain a much deeper understanding of this issue and to promote a fluid dialogue between all of the stakeholders: Islamic religion teachers, the Islamic community, families and pupils. This would call for additional research that includes the views of Muslim pupils and their families in this regard. We would thus be able to avoid what has happened in other countries like the England (Faure-Walker, 2019), whose strategies are having the opposite effects to those intended.

## Funding

This paper has been written in the framework of the Research Plan of the University of Seville (VPPi-US-2016): Pre-doctoral or trainee researcher grants; and as part of the project 'Islam and peace through Muslim voices. Preventive socio-educational

measures', funded by the Office of Development and Cooperation of the University of Seville.

## Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tate.2020.103138>.

## References

- ABC. (2017, August 22). La Comisión Islámica de España trabaja en un censo de imanes. ABC España <https://bit.ly/2M17EZY>.
- Abdullah, K., Sukma, R., Jamhari, M., & Musa, M. (2012). Perception and attitudes toward terrorism in a Muslim majority country. *Asian Social Science*, 8(4), 77–89. <https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v8n4p77>.
- Aown, N. (2011). A place for informal learning in teaching about religion: The story of an experienced non-Muslim teacher and her learning about Islam. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 27(8), 1255–1264. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tate.2011.07.005>.
- Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). The edge of violence: Towards telling the difference between violent and non-violent radicalization. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(1), 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.594923>.
- Biencinto, C., Carpintero, E., & García-García, M. (2013). Psychometric properties of the ActEval questionnaire on university teacher's assessment activity. *Revista Electrónica de Investigación y Evaluación Educativa*, 19(1), 1–14.
- BOE. (1978). Constitución española. <https://bit.ly/2AclnSM>.
- BOE. (1992). Ley 26/1992, de 10 de noviembre, por la que se aprueba el Acuerdo de Cooperación del Estado con la Comisión Islámica de España. <https://bit.ly/3gpTcbu>.
- BOE. (2006). Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación. Boletín Oficial del Estado, (106), de 4 de mayo de 2006. : <https://bit.ly/3grh1PZ>.
- BOE. (2013). Ley Orgánica 8/2013, de 9 de diciembre, para la mejora de la calidad educativa. <https://bit.ly/36uhn3K>.
- BOE. (2014). Resolución de 26 de noviembre de 2014, de la Dirección General de Evaluación y Cooperación Territorial, por la que se publica el currículo del área Enseñanza Religión Islámica de la Educación Primaria. <https://bit.ly/3d4xCqW>.
- BOE. (2016). Resolución de 14 de marzo de 2016, de la Dirección General de Evaluación y Cooperación Territorial, por la que se publican los currículos de la materia de Religión Islámica en Educación Secundaria Obligatoria y Bachillerato. <https://bit.ly/3ecoSiC>.
- Brooks, M. C., & Ezzani, M. D. (2017). 'Being wholly Muslim and wholly American': Exploring one Islamic school's efforts to educate against extremism. *Teachers College Record*, 119(6), 1–32. <https://bit.ly/3d5NFVd>.
- CIS. (2019). Barómetro de diciembre 2019. <https://bit.ly/36vPatl>.
- Corpas, M. (2010). *Las comunidades islámicas en la España actual (1960–2008)*. Madrid, Spain: UNED.
- Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2012). *Qualitative inquiry & research design: Choosing among five approaches* (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.
- Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010). Violent radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33(9), 797–814. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.501423>.
- Davies, L. (2009). Educating against extremism: Towards a critical politicisation of young people. *International Review of Education*, 55(2–3), 183–203. <https://bit.ly/2TIOWKu>.
- Davies, L. (2016). Security, extremism and education: Safeguarding or surveillance? *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 64(1), 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00071005.2015.1107022>.
- Deckard, N., & Jacobson, D. (2015). The prosperous hardliner: Affluence, fundamentalism, and radicalization in Western European Muslim communities. *Social Compass*, 62(3), 412–433. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768615587827>.
- Dietz, G., Rosón, F., & Ruiz, F. (2011). Homogeneidad confesional en tiempos de pluralismo religioso: Una encuesta cualitativa con jóvenes españoles sobre religión y educación. *CPU-e. Revista de Investigación Educativa*, (13), 1–43.
- Díez de Velasco, F. (2016). The teaching of religions in Spanish schools: Vicissitudes of the model of segregated classroom. *Historia y Memoria de la Educación*, 4, 277–306. <https://doi.org/10.5944/hme.4.2016.15484>.
- Elghazi, S. (2018). La gestión del islam en España: Entre el islam inmigrante y el islam español. *Historia Actual On-Line*, 46(2), 91–104. <https://bit.ly/2TG78nY>.
- European Commission. (2017). *The contribution of youth work to preventing marginalisation and violent radicalisation A practical toolbox for youth workers & Recommendations for policy makers*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. <https://bit.ly/2X44E4E>.
- Europol. (2019). *Terrorism situation and trend report*. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. <https://bit.ly/3c3iXl9>.
- Faure-Walker, R. (2019). Teachers as informants: Countering extremism and promoting violence. *Journal of Beliefs and Values*, 40(3), 368–380. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13617672.2019.1600321>.
- Floyd, F., & Widaman, K. (1995). Factor analysis in the development and refinement of clinical assessment instruments. *Psychological Assessment*, 7(3), 286–299. <https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.7.3.286>.
- Franken, L. (2017). Coping with diversity in religious education: An overview. *Journal of Beliefs and Values*, 38(1), 105–120. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13617672.2016.1270504>.
- Frissen, T., Toguslu, E., Van Ostaeyen, P., & d'Haenens, L. (2018). Capitalizing on the koran to fuel online violent radicalization: A taxonomy of koranic references in ISIS's dabiq. *Telematics and Informatics*, 35, 491–503. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tate.2018.01.008>.
- García, A. (2017). Al-Andalus en la historiografía nacionalcatólica española: Claudio Sánchez Albornoz. *eHumanista. J. Iberian Stud.*, 37, 305–328. <https://bit.ly/2ZERsVY>.
- García, S., & Talavero, V. (2019). A sociological approach to the extremist radicalization in islam: The need for indicators. *Int. J. Intell. Secur. Publ. Affair.*, 21(1), 66–83. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2019.1598096>.
- Garreta-Bochaca, J., Macia-Bordalba, M., & Llevot-Calvet, N. (2018). Religious education in state primary schools: The case of Catalonia (Spain). *British Journal of Religious Education*, 41(2), 145–154. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2018.1437392>.
- Ghosh, R. (2018). The potential of the ERC program for combating violent extremism among youth. *Religion Education*, 45(3), 370–386. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15507394.2018.1546509>.
- Grasso, A. (2019). Imams in western Europe. Developments, transformations, and institutional challenges. In M. Hashas, J. J. de Ruiters, & N. V. Vinding (Eds.), *Archives de sciences sociales des religions* (pp. 336–338). Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press.
- Gunther, D. (2008). La educación religiosa en España: ¿contribución al diálogo intercultural o factor de conflicto entre religiones? *Estudios sobre las Culturas Contemporáneas*, 14(28), 11–46. <https://bit.ly/3ekiSUT>.
- Gurlesin, O., Akdag, M., & Avest, I. (2020). Playful religion: An innovative approach to prevent radicalisation of Muslim youth in Europe. *Religions*, 11(2), 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11020067>.
- Hafez, M., & Mullins, C. (2015). The radicalization puzzle: A theoretical synthesis of empirical approaches to homegrown extremism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38(11), 958–975. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375>.
- Hedges, P. (2017). Radicalisation: Examining a concept, its use and abuse. *Counter Terrorist Trends Anal.*, 9(10), 12–18. <https://bit.ly/3c7Awta>.
- Ibarra, E. (2018). La intolerancia en la raíz del extremismo violento. *Cuadernos de Análisis*, 61, 1–83. <https://bit.ly/3ewVQKT>.
- IMED. (2017). *Violent extremism in the euro-mediterranean region* (8th ed.). Barcelona, Spain: Euro-Mediterranean Policies Department.
- INE. (2020). Población extranjera por sexo, comunidades y provincias y nacionalidad. <https://bit.ly/3ddZOYz>.
- Karakaya, S. (2015). Religion and conflict: Explaining the puzzling case of "Islamic violence". *International Interactions*, 41(3), 509–538. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1016158>.
- Krippendorff, K. (2018). *Content analysis*. California: SAGE Publications.
- Larochelle. (2007). Romanos, godos y moros en la construcción de la morada vital hispana: Reflexiones desde el multiculturalismo y la interculturalidad. *Tinkuy*, (5), 41–50. <https://bit.ly/3d7gVLA>.
- Larsson, G. (2017). Apostasy and counter-narratives—two sides of the same coin: The example of the Islamic state. *Rev. Faith Int. Affair.*, 15(2), 45–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2017.1329397>.
- Larsson, G., & Raciús, E. (2010). A different approach to the history of Islam and Muslims in Europe: A north-eastern angle, or the need to reconsider the research field. *Journal of Religion in Europe*, 3(3), 350–373. <https://doi.org/10.1163/187489210X518510>.
- López, P. (2011). *Libertad religiosa y cooperación en el Estado español. El caso de las comunidades musulmanas*. MEAH (Vol. 60, pp. 175–198). <https://bit.ly/2TF4dMq>.
- McGilloway, A., Ghosh, P., & Bhui, K. (2015). A systematic review of pathways to and processes associated with radicalization and extremism amongst Muslims in Western societies. *International Review of Psychiatry*, 27(1), 39–50. <https://doi.org/10.3109/09540261.2014.992008>.
- Meehan, C., & Meehan, P. (2019). Exploring the role of 'RE' in early childhood education and care as a response to the PREVENT agenda in England. *Early Child Development and Care*, 189(7), 1174–1188. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03004430.2017.1369978>.
- Ministerio de Educación. (2009). Guía práctica del profesorado de lengua árabe y cultura marroquí. Gobierno de España. Embajada del Reino de Marruecos en Madrid. <https://bit.ly/3c57FGq>.
- Moffat, A., & Gerard, F. J. (2019). Securitising education: An exploration of teachers' attitudes and experiences regarding the implementation of the prevent duty in sixth form colleges. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2019.1629860>.
- Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The staircase to terrorism: A psychological exploration. *American Psychologist*, 60(2), 161–169. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161>.
- Myers, M., & Bhopal, K. (2018). Muslims, home education and risk in British society. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 39(2), 212–226. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01425692.2017.1406337>.
- Núñez, J. (2017). Los métodos mixtos en la investigación en educación: Hacia un uso reflexivo. *Cadernos de Pesquisa*, 47(164), 632–649. <https://doi.org/10.1590/198053143763>.
- Omeliicheva, M. Y. (2016). Islam and power legitimization: Instrumentalisation of religion in central Asian states. *Contemporary Politics*, 22(2), 144–163. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1153287>.
- Ortiz, A. (2015). *Enfoques y métodos de investigación en las ciencias sociales y humanas*. Bogotá, Colombia. Ediciones de la U.
- OSCE. (2018). The role of civil society in preventing and countering violent

- extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism. <https://bit.ly/2X43WV2>.
- Ouassini, A. (2019). Have come back home: The Spanish-Moroccan community, collective memory, and sacred spaces in contemporary Spain. *Religions*, 10(2), 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10020128>.
- Pearce, S., & Lewis, K. (2019). Changing attitudes to cultural difference: Perceptions of Muslim families in English schools. *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 49(1), 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0305764X.2018.1427217>.
- Pérez, M. V. (2018). *Mujeres musulmanas: Autoridad y erudiciones islámicas del contexto árabe al Islam transnacional* (Tesis Doctoral). Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Departamento de Estudios Árabes e Islámicos y Estudios Orientales <https://bit.ly/3gJeq4i>.
- Poushter, J., & Manevich, D. (2017). *Globally, people point to ISIS and climate change as leading security threats*. Pew Research Center. <https://pewrsr.ch/2Xumxc6>.
- Pratt, D. (2010). Religion and terrorism: Christian fundamentalism and extremism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(3), 438–456. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546551003689399>.
- Prinsloo, B. L. (2018). The etymology of “islamic extremism”: A misunderstood term? *Cogent Soc. Sci.*, 4(1), 1–8. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2018.1463815>.
- Quartermaine, A. (2016). Discussing terrorism: A pupil-inspired guide to UK counter-terrorism policy implementation in religious education classrooms in England. *British Journal of Religious Education*, 38(1), 13–29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2014.953911>.
- Queirós, A., Faria, D., & Almeida, F. (2017). Strengths and limitations of qualitative and quantitative research methods. *Europ. J. Educ. Stud.*, 3(9), 369–387. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.887089>.
- RAN. (2015). Manifesto for education-empowering educators and schools. <https://bit.ly/36vd48t>.
- RAN. (2016). The role of education in preventing radicalisation. <https://bit.ly/2B390ke>.
- RAN. (2019). Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism. Training for first-line practitioners. <https://bit.ly/36zQknY>.
- Rea-Ramírez, M. A., & Ramírez, T. M. (2017). Changing attitudes, changing behaviors. Conceptual change as a model for teaching freedom of religion or belief. *J. Soc. Sci. Educ.*, 16(4), 97–108.
- Real Decreto 276/2007, of 23 February. Retrieved from <https://bit.ly/3gkgsYt>.
- Real Decreto 696/2007, de 1 de junio, por el que se regula la relación laboral de los profesores de religión prevista en la disposición adicional tercera de la Ley Orgánica 2/2006, de 3 de mayo, de Educación. Retrieved from: <https://bit.ly/36uEJq9>.
- Revell, L. (2019). Teacher practice and the pre-crime space: Prevent safeguarding and teacher engagement with extremism and radicalisation. *Practice*, 1(1), 21–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/25783858.2019.1591765>.
- Rissanen, I., Kuusisto, E., & Kuusisto, A. (2016). Developing teachers' intercultural sensitivity: Case study on a pilot course in Finnish teacher education. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 59, 446–456. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tate.2016.07.018>.
- Rissanen, I., & Sai, Y. (2017). A comparative study of how social cohesion is taught in Islamic religious education in Finland and Ireland. *British Journal of Religious Education*, 40(3), 337–347. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2017.1352487>.
- Robinson, O. C. (2014). Sampling in interview-based qualitative research: A theoretical and practical guide. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 11(1), 25–41. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14780887.2013.801543>.
- Rodríguez, J. (2019). Islamic religious education and the plan against violent radicalisation in Spain. *British Journal of Religious Education*, 41(4), 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2018.1484693>.
- Roy, O. (2015, November 23). Olivier Roy: Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste. *Lemond.fr*. <https://bit.ly/2THDaQx>.
- Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terrorist networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Tatary, R. (2017a). *Campaña a favor de la Enseñanza religiosa islámica. Comisión Islámica de España*. <https://bit.ly/2M15d96>.
- Tatary, R. (2017b). *Requisitos que debe reunir el profesorado de enseñanza islámica*. CIE. <https://bit.ly/2zvosoN>.
- Tibi, B. (2009). Islamism and democracy: On the compatibility of institutional islamism and the political culture of democracy. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10(2), 135–164. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14690760903192073>.
- Trujillo, H., & Moyano, M. (2008). El sistema educativo español en la prevención de la radicalización yihadista. *Athena Intelligence Journal*, 3(2), 75–83. <https://bit.ly/2ZBIUil>.
- UCIDE. (2014). Entrevista con el presidente de la Comisión Islámica de España. <https://bit.ly/2X1W0nf>.
- UCIDE. (2018). Informe anual 2017. Unión de Comunidades islámicas de España. <https://bit.ly/2LXSUKG>.
- UCIDE. (2020a). Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. <https://bit.ly/3emR56m>.
- UCIDE. (2020b). Historia de la Unión de Comunidades islámicas de España (UCIDE). <https://bit.ly/2UHY6aR>.
- UEX. (2019). Firmado un convenio con la Comisión Islámica de España para la formación de imanes. <https://bit.ly/2x3gzpe>.
- UNESCO. (2018). Preventing violent extremism through education. A guide for policy-makers. <https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/policymakr.pdf>.
- Uprichard, E., & Dawney, L. (2019). Data diffraction: Challenging data integration in mixed methods research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 13(1), 19–32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1558689816674650>.
- Van Velzen, J. (2018). Students' general knowledge of the learning process: A mixed methods study illustrating integrated data collection and data consolidation. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 12(2), 182–203. <https://doi.org/10.1177/15586898166651792>.
- Verkuyten, M. (2018). Religious fundamentalism and radicalization among Muslim minority youth in Europe. *European Psychologist*, 23(1), 21–31. <https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000314>.
- Zhirkov, K., Verkuyten, M., & Weesie, J. (2014). Perceptions of world politics and support for terrorism among Muslims: Evidence from Muslim countries and Western Europe. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 31(5), 481–501. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213510121>.
- Zuhdi, M. (2018). Challenging moderate Muslims: Indonesia's Muslim schools in the midst of religious conservatism. *Religions*, 9(10), 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9100310>.
- Prof. Ph. D. Full Vicente Llorent-Bedmar. He is a Senior Lecturer at Department of Theory and History of Education and Social Pedagogy of University of Seville. Doctor's degree in Pedagogy at this university. Past Presidente of Spanish Society of Comparative Education (SEEC). Director of the Research group GIECSE (Comparative Education of Seville). Past President of Spanish Society of Comparative Education. Most of his work involves questions about women, islam and education in the Maghreb. Postal address: Departamento de Teoría e Historia de la Educación y Pedagogía Social. Universidad de Sevilla. C/ Pirotecnia s/n Código Postal: 41013 (Sevilla, España). ORCID: 0000-0003-4166-6098 email address: [llorent@us.es](mailto:llorent@us.es)
- Prof. Ph. D. Verónica Carmen Cobano-Delgado (corresponding author). She is a professor At Department of Theory and History of Education and Social Pedagogy of University of Seville. Doctor's degree in Pedagogy at this university. Member of the Research group (GIECSE) (Comparative Education of Seville). Most of her work involves questions about women, islam an education in the Maghreb. Postal address: Departamento de Teoría e Historia de la Educación y Pedagogía Social. Universidad de Sevilla. C/ Pirotecnia s/n Código Postal: 41013 (Sevilla, España). Telephone number: +0034955420575 email address: [cobano@us.es](mailto:cobano@us.es). ORCID: 0000-0001-7054-4191
- Prof. D. María Navarro-Granados. She is a grant holder at At Department of Theory and History of Education and Social Pedagogy of University of Seville. Member of the Research group (GIECSE) (Comparative Education of Seville). Most of her work involves questions about women, islam an education in disadvantaged contexts. Postal address: Departamento de Teoría e Historia de la Educación y Pedagogía Social. Universidad de Sevilla. C/ Pirotecnia s/n Código Postal: 41013 (Sevilla, España). ORCID: 0000-0001-7578-6659 email address: [mnavarro11@us.es](mailto:mnavarro11@us.es)